

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TO
“PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY OVER SPACE AND TIME”

Countries and respective time series included in analysis

Table 17: Countries and respective time series included in analysis. T_i refers to the total number of years each country i is included in the data.

| country i | first year coded | last year coded | T_i |
|----------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------|
| Afghanistan | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Albania | 1912 | 2019 | 108 |
| Algeria | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Angola | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Argentina | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Armenia | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Australia | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Austria | 1789 | 2019 | 225 |
| Azerbaijan | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Baden | 1789 | 1871 | 83 |
| Bahrain | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Bangladesh | 1971 | 2019 | 49 |
| Barbados | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Bavaria | 1789 | 1871 | 83 |
| Belarus | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Belgium | 1789 | 2019 | 197 |
| Benin | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Bhutan | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Bolivia | 1825 | 2019 | 195 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1992 | 2019 | 28 |
| Botswana | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Brazil | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Brunswick | 1789 | 1867 | 74 |
| Bulgaria | 1878 | 2019 | 142 |
| Burkina Faso | 1919 | 2019 | 86 |
| Burma/Myanmar | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Burundi | 1916 | 2019 | 104 |
| Cambodia | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Cameroon | 1961 | 2019 | 59 |
| Canada | 1841 | 2019 | 179 |
| Cape Verde | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Central African Republic | 1920 | 2019 | 100 |
| Chad | 1920 | 2019 | 100 |
| Chile | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| China | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Colombia | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Comoros | 1900 | 2019 | 88 |
| Costa Rica | 1838 | 2019 | 182 |
| Croatia | 1941 | 2019 | 33 |
| Cuba | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Cyprus | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Czech Republic | 1918 | 2019 | 102 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Denmark | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Djibouti | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Dominican Republic | 1789 | 2019 | 210 |
| Ecuador | 1830 | 2019 | 190 |
| Egypt | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| El Salvador | 1838 | 2019 | 182 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Eritrea | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Estonia | 1918 | 2019 | 52 |

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Table 17 – continued from previous page

| country i | first year coded | last year coded | T_i |
|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------|
| Eswatini | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Ethiopia | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Fiji | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Finland | 1809 | 2019 | 211 |
| France | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Gabon | 1910 | 2019 | 110 |
| Georgia | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| German Democratic Republic | 1945 | 1990 | 46 |
| Germany | 1789 | 2019 | 227 |
| Ghana | 1902 | 2019 | 118 |
| Greece | 1822 | 2019 | 198 |
| Guatemala | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Guinea | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Guyana | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Haiti | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Hanover | 1789 | 1866 | 76 |
| Hesse-Darmstadt | 1789 | 1871 | 83 |
| Honduras | 1838 | 2019 | 182 |
| Hong Kong | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Hungary | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Iceland | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| India | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Indonesia | 1800 | 2019 | 220 |
| Iran | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Iraq | 1920 | 2019 | 100 |
| Ireland | 1919 | 2019 | 101 |
| Israel | 1948 | 2019 | 72 |
| Italy | 1861 | 2019 | 159 |
| Ivory Coast | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Jamaica | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Japan | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Jordan | 1922 | 2019 | 98 |
| Kazakhstan | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Kenya | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Kosovo | 1999 | 2019 | 21 |
| Kuwait | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Laos | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Latvia | 1920 | 2019 | 50 |
| Lebanon | 1918 | 2019 | 102 |
| Lesotho | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Liberia | 1821 | 2019 | 199 |
| Libya | 1789 | 2019 | 146 |
| Lithuania | 1918 | 2019 | 52 |
| Luxembourg | 1815 | 2019 | 205 |
| Madagascar | 1817 | 2019 | 203 |
| Malawi | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Malaysia | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Maldives | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Mali | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Malta | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Mauritania | 1904 | 2019 | 116 |
| Mauritius | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Mecklenburg Schwerin | 1789 | 1867 | 79 |
| Mexico | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Modena | 1789 | 1859 | 55 |
| Moldova | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Mongolia | 1911 | 2019 | 109 |
| Montenegro | 1789 | 2019 | 152 |
| Morocco | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Mozambique | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Namibia | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Nepal | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |

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Table 17 – continued from previous page

| country i | first year coded | last year coded | T_i |
|---------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------|
| Netherlands | 1789 | 2019 | 229 |
| New Zealand | 1841 | 2019 | 179 |
| Nicaragua | 1838 | 2019 | 182 |
| Niger | 1922 | 2019 | 98 |
| Nigeria | 1914 | 2019 | 106 |
| North Korea | 1945 | 2019 | 75 |
| North Macedonia | 1991 | 2019 | 29 |
| Norway | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Oldenburg | 1789 | 1867 | 77 |
| Oman | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Pakistan | 1947 | 2019 | 73 |
| Palestine/British Mandate | 1918 | 1948 | 31 |
| Palestine/Gaza | 1948 | 2019 | 32 |
| Palestine/West Bank | 1948 | 2019 | 55 |
| Panama | 1903 | 2019 | 117 |
| Papal States | 1789 | 1861 | 69 |
| Papua New Guinea | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Paraguay | 1811 | 2019 | 209 |
| Parma | 1789 | 1859 | 60 |
| Peru | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Philippines | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Piedmont-Sardinia | 1789 | 1861 | 73 |
| Poland | 1789 | 2019 | 165 |
| Portugal | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Qatar | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Republic of Vietnam | 1802 | 1975 | 174 |
| Republic of the Congo | 1903 | 2019 | 117 |
| Romania | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Russia | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Rwanda | 1916 | 2019 | 104 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Saudi Arabia | 1789 | 2019 | 228 |
| Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach | 1809 | 1867 | 59 |
| Saxony | 1789 | 1867 | 79 |
| Senegal | 1904 | 2019 | 116 |
| Serbia | 1804 | 2019 | 215 |
| Seychelles | 1903 | 2019 | 117 |
| Sierra Leone | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Singapore | 1867 | 2019 | 153 |
| Slovakia | 1939 | 2019 | 33 |
| Slovenia | 1989 | 2019 | 31 |
| Solomon Islands | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Somalia | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Somaliland | 1900 | 2019 | 89 |
| South Africa | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| South Korea | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| South Sudan | 2011 | 2019 | 9 |
| South Yemen | 1900 | 1990 | 91 |
| Spain | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Sri Lanka | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Sudan | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Suriname | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Sweden | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Switzerland | 1798 | 2019 | 222 |
| Syria | 1918 | 2019 | 100 |
| Taiwan | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Tajikistan | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Tanzania | 1914 | 2019 | 106 |
| Thailand | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| The Gambia | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Timor-Leste | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Togo | 1916 | 2019 | 104 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Tunisia | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |

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Table 17 – continued from previous page

| country i | first year coded | last year coded | T_i |
|--------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------|
| Turkey | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Turkmenistan | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| Tuscany | 1789 | 1861 | 67 |
| Two Sicilies | 1789 | 1860 | 72 |
| Uganda | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Ukraine | 1990 | 2019 | 30 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1971 | 2019 | 49 |
| United Kingdom | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| United States of America | 1789 | 2019 | 231 |
| Uruguay | 1825 | 2019 | 195 |
| Uzbekistan | 1789 | 2019 | 162 |
| Vanuatu | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |
| Venezuela | 1789 | 2019 | 221 |
| Vietnam | 1945 | 2019 | 75 |
| Württemberg | 1789 | 1871 | 83 |
| Yemen | 1789 | 2019 | 164 |
| Zambia | 1911 | 2019 | 109 |
| Zanzibar | 1856 | 2019 | 164 |
| Zimbabwe | 1900 | 2019 | 120 |

I Extended summary statistics, Narrow Participation Model

| Model | Variable | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------|------|--------|
| | Electoral Democracy Index | 18.19 | 1.41 | 81.32 |
| | Liberal Democracy Index | 16.18 | 1.45 | 73.11 |
| | Constraints | 21.10 | 1.85 | 82.04 |
| Narrow Participation: | Contestation 1 | 25.49 | 0.00 | 95.48 |
| | Participation 1 | 27.38 | 0.00 | 100.00 |
| Broad Participation: | Contestation 2 | 25.63 | 0.00 | 95.38 |
| | Participation 2 | 23.06 | 0.00 | 95.54 |

Table 18: Assessing variation between country means in each dimension

| | Variable | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------|-------|
| | Electoral Democracy Index | 19.75 | -61.26 | 70.32 |
| | Liberal Democracy Index | 16.28 | -57.76 | 66.78 |
| | Constraints | 17.96 | -65.86 | 80.42 |
| Narrow Participation: | Contestation 1 | 30.99 | -95.48 | 86.97 |
| | Participation 1 | 40.70 | -98.61 | 99.39 |
| Broad Participation: | Contestation 2 | 31.54 | -95.38 | 91.46 |
| | Participation 2 | 30.95 | -95.54 | 86.21 |

Table 19: Assessing the within country variation. Min (Max) refer to lowest (highest) deviation from a country's mean.

J Replication Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020

| <i>Dependent Variable:</i> | Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020 | | Replication with our measures | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| <i>Conflict Onset</i> | Model 1 | Model 2 | Contestation | Participation | Constraints | All | Subcubes |
| Vertical Constraints Index | -1.146* | | | | | | |
| | (0.529) | | | | | | |
| Horizontal Constraints Index | | -0.955** | | | | | |
| | | (0.348) | | | | | |
| Contestation | | | -0.326 | | | 0.0553 | |
| | | | (0.242) | | | (0.362) | |
| Participation | | | | -0.0670 | | 0.0802 | |
| | | | | (0.210) | | (0.263) | |
| Constraints | | | | | -0.912* | -1.007* | |
| | | | | | (0.362) | (0.428) | |
| Participation Only | | | | | | | 0.113 |
| | | | | | | | (0.221) |
| Contestation Only | | | | | | | 1.523** |
| | | | | | | | (0.466) |
| Participation & Contestation | | | | | | | -0.0607 |
| | | | | | | | (0.260) |
| Democracy | | | | | | | -0.518 |
| | | | | | | | (0.319) |
| Mid-point | | | | | | | 0.267 |
| | | | | | | | (0.315) |
| Constant | -4.348*** | -4.037*** | -3.920*** | -3.820*** | -4.126*** | -4.167*** | -4.348*** |
| | (0.718) | (0.750) | (0.716) | (0.745) | (0.725) | (0.735) | (0.750) |
| AIC | 1663.3 | 1660.3 | 1706.1 | 1708.0 | 1700.1 | 1703.8 | 1698.3 |
| LL | -821.6 | -820.2 | -843.0 | -844.0 | -840.1 | -839.9 | -835.2 |
| N | 7035 | 7035 | 7189 | 7189 | 7189 | 7189 | 7132 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 20: Replication of Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020. Further control variables included in each model (but not reported here): ln Population, ln GDP p.c., Ethnic fractionalization, Mountainous terrain, Neighbouring conflict, Years since conflict, Years since conflict squared, Years since conflict cubed. All covariates are lagged one year. The replication (columns 3-7) is carried out for the contestation and participation from our *narrow participation model*. Each of our three dimension variables in columns 3-6 is re-scaled between 0-1. Column 7 includes dummies for each subcube. Subcube “Autocracy” is the base category. Subcubes “Constraints Only”, “Participation and Constraints”, and “Contestation and Constraints” are dropped because they perfectly predict “no conflict onset”. Time series extend from 1946 to 2016.

In this section, we demonstrate the value added by our three-dimensional approach to democracy measurement in an empirical application. We replicate the benchmark models (1) and (2) from Table 1, Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020 on civil conflict onset, which is a particularly relevant analysis for us to replicate since Fjelde et al. are already employing a disaggregated approach, employing two distinct “constraints” indices rather than one unidimensional democracy measure. However, our three-dimensional measure is even more nuanced than the two measures used in Fjelde et al., and the below replication shows that each of our dimensions have differential power in explaining onset of civil conflict. In addition, we show how the ob-

| <i>Dependent Variable</i> | Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020 | | Replication with our measures | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| <i>Conflict Onset</i> | Model 1 | Model 2 | contestation | participation | constraints | all | subcubes |
| Vertical Constraints Index | -1.164* | | | | | | |
| | (0.530) | | | | | | |
| Horizontal Constraints Index | | -0.955** | | | | | |
| | | (0.347) | | | | | |
| Contestation | | | -0.312 | | | 0.0627 | |
| | | | (0.248) | | | (0.369) | |
| Participation | | | | -0.0345 | | 0.107 | |
| | | | | (0.214) | | (0.267) | |
| Constraints | | | | | -0.914* | -1.026* | |
| | | | | | (0.366) | (0.432) | |
| Participation Only | | | | | | | 0.153 |
| | | | | | | | (0.223) |
| Contestation Only | | | | | | | 1.529** |
| | | | | | | | (0.474) |
| Participation & Contestation | | | | | | | -0.0259 |
| | | | | | | | (0.262) |
| Democracy | | | | | | | -0.486 |
| | | | | | | | (0.326) |
| Mid-point | | | | | | | 0.307 |
| | | | | | | | (0.315) |
| Constant | -4.295*** | -3.983*** | -3.964*** | -3.865*** | -4.158*** | -4.207*** | -4.411*** |
| | (0.717) | (0.749) | (0.718) | (0.745) | (0.727) | (0.734) | (0.743) |
| AIC | 1661.0 | 1658.2 | 1665.2 | 1667.0 | 1659.1 | 1662.6 | 1657.1 |
| LL | -820.5 | -819.1 | -822.6 | -823.5 | -819.6 | -819.3 | -814.5 |
| N | 6985 | 6985 | 6985 | 6985 | 6985 | 6985 | 6930 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 21: Replication of Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020 for shared sample with non-missing values on institutional variables of interest. Further control variables included in each model (but not reported here): \ln Population, \ln GDP p.c., Ethnic fractionalization, Mountainous terrain, Neighbouring conflict, Years since conflict, Years since conflict squared, Years since conflict cubed. All covariates are lagged one year. The replication (columns 3-7) is carried out for the contestation and participation from our *narrow participation model*. Each of our three dimension variables in columns 3-6 are re-scaled between 0-1. Column 7 includes dummies for each subcube. Subcube “Autocracy” is the base category. Subcubes “Constraints Only”, “Participation and Constraints”, and “Contestation and Constraints” are dropped because they perfectly predict “no conflict onset”. Time series extend from 1946 to 2016.

| Subcube | Pred. prob. of conflict onset | Number of observations | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| | | in subcube | with conflict onset |
| Autocracy | 0.0402 | 2801 | 66 |
| Participation Only | 0.0378 | 2408 | 69 |
| Contestation Only | 0.0532 | 55 | 2 |
| Participation & Contestation | 0.0313 | 1550 | 32 |
| Constraints Only | 0.0528 | 26 | 1 |
| Participation & Constraints | 0.0539 | 108 | 2 |
| Contestation & Constraints | 0.1093 | 1 | 0 |
| Democracy | 0.0192 | 3582 | 31 |
| Mid-point | 0.0345 | 2871 | 21 |

Table 22: Predicted probabilities of conflict onset by subcube. The predicted probabilities are based on model (1) & (2) from Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020 without any institutional variables (VCI or HCI), i.e. with covariates only.

servations within our different subcubes (as presented in the paper) are more/less likely to experience conflict onset.

Table 20 replicates the above mentioned models with as many observations available as possible. Columns (1) and (2) are pure replications of the models in Fjelde, Knutsen, and Nygård, 2020. In columns (3) - (6) we add the measures for our three dimensions (narrow participation model) instead of the vertical (VCI) and horizontal constraints (HCI) variables used in the original study. As seen from Columns (1) and (2), Fjelde et al.’s benchmark specifications report that their measures of vertical as well as horizontal constraints are both negatively related to civil war onset.

Interestingly, we only find a clear relationship between our constraints dimension, which taps a fairly similar concept and uses overlapping indicators to Fjelde et al.’s HCI. Somewhat simplified, Fjelde et al.’s VCI incorporates elements that are included both in our contestation and participation measures. When disentangling these dimensions, we fail to find systematic evidence that any of them, in isolation, mitigate the risk of civil war onset. In fact, this finding is in line with the theoretical argument proposed by Fjelde et al., who explicitly state that only when effective electoral competition and widespread participation occur together, should one expect vertical constraints on incumbents (imposed by large population groups) to mitigate the risk of civil war (see p.226). Our measures thus give empirical support to this proposition.

In the last column, we use dummies for each of our subcubes as measures of institutional configurations instead of our dimensions or the VCI/HCI variables. In this model, all observations in subcubes scoring high on the constraints dimensions (i.e. “Participation & Constraints”, “contestation & Constraints”, “Constraints Only”) are omitted as they perfectly predict “no conflict onset”. The latter result likely reflects that the time series of the replication only extends from 1946-2016; certain institutional configurations were far less common in these decades than in earlier periods of modern history and there are relatively few conflict onset observations.

Table 21 runs the same regressions as Table 20 but for a shared sample of observations with non-missing values on all variables of interest across our models (1) - (7).

As noted above, in the subcube models (7) (in both Tables 20 & 21) all of the cubes with constraints are dropped as they perfectly predict no conflict onset, i.e. there are no cases with conflict onset in each of the constraints cubes. (Again, we remind that the time series in this replication only extends from 1946-2016, yielding few observations in some subcubes.) Does that imply constraints are useful in preventing conflict onset? To investigate the role of the constraints subcubes further, we also ran one model without any institutional variables AND without subcubes. That is, we use the pure control variables. In a second step, we use this control variable model to predict the probability of conflict onset. We then calculate average probability of conflict onset (based on this regression, i.e. based on the control variables only) for each subcube. The results (Table 22) show that in the constraints subcubes the probability of conflict onset is actually highest of all subcubes. A possible explanation for this could be that the observations in the constraints subcubes are very unstable/short lived and soon move into other cubes which is then were conflict sets in.

K Comparison with uni-dimensional indices

A key issue of validity is the joint correlation of our measure to existing uni-dimensional measures. There are several uni-dimensional democracy measures currently available, and we run our three dimensions against eight different uni-dimensional measures (Coppedge et al., 2020a, p. 346).

We calculate the correlations using an OLS model and report $\sqrt{R^2}$ for each model. All eight models correlate between 0.8 and 0.9, which does not challenge any notions of validity. However, the three coefficients do differ quite a lot across the eight models. Constraints and contestation always point in the same direction (keep in mind that FreedomHouse's low values are the most democratic). Participation does not.

| | (1) Boix | (2) CGV | (3) LIED | (4) Polity 5 |
|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| Contestation | 0.00463*** (43.31) | 0.00445*** (27.98) | 0.0236*** (55.21) | 0.0726*** (46.72) |
| Participation | 0.000478*** (6.97) | -0.000736*** (-7.00) | 0.00843*** (30.69) | -0.00172 (-1.71) |
| Constraints | 0.00681*** (59.86) | 0.00840*** (50.07) | 0.0310*** (69.04) | 0.111*** (68.10) |
| Constant | -0.144*** (-36.11) | -0.0843*** (-11.66) | 0.296*** (18.89) | -7.204*** (-121.70) |
| N | 15569 | 8477 | 17042 | 16502 |
| R | 0.804 | 0.806 | 0.870 | 0.811 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

| | (1) FH | (2) FH CL | (3) FH PR | (4) UDS |
|---------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Contestation | -0.00684*** (-25.91) | -0.0136*** (-23.15) | -0.0214*** (-36.40) | 0.00742*** (33.09) |
| Participation | 0.00102*** (5.49) | 0.00230*** (5.57) | 0.00190*** (4.61) | 0.0000221 (0.15) |
| Constraints | -0.0154*** (-57.63) | -0.0398*** (-66.77) | -0.0417*** (-70.06) | 0.0204*** (86.96) |
| Constant | 2.926*** (222.70) | 6.156*** (210.31) | 6.762*** (231.20) | -1.234*** (-118.69) |
| N | 7568 | 7568 | 7568 | 9227 |
| R | 0.840 | 0.857 | 0.894 | 0.899 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The participation coefficients point in different directions because the way in which participation has been implemented and measures has changed over time. This is also true for the two other coefficients.




Figure 23: Coefficient of the Three Dimensions by Decade vs. Boix

Participation is the most prominent driver of Boix' democracy indicator for most of the 19th century, but is more or less irrelevant for most of the 20th century, even dropping well below 0 for the most recent period. This is not surprising. As universal suffrage has become dominant, the dictators of the post WWII era often had to secure power by limiting either competition or constraints.

For the Boix measure, we see that constraints is the dominant driver for most of the 20th century, but contestation has become dominant in the most recent decades. This is also in line with the tendencies in the democratic decline. Electoral autocracies are often successful

when they manage to either limit opposition parties or divide the opposition into a myriad of ineffective players.




Figure 24: Coefficient of the Three Dimensions by Decade vs. Polity 5

The Polity V correlates look very much like the Boix graph, except that contestation plays a larger role in the 19th century. But both the decline of participation and the rise of constraints is visible in this figure as well.

These findings are highly compatible with our discussion in Section 4.2. Democracy has developed very much both as an idea and as institutions over the last 220 years, and these figures underscore this development. The great difficulty any persistent definition or measure of democracy has in encompassing this development is in it self an argument for why a disaggregated measure is needed.